Showing posts with label statutory interpretation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label statutory interpretation. Show all posts

Saturday, January 2, 2010

Garcia v. Holder, No. 07-72516 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 2009).

This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to review the BIA’s order dismissing the petitioner’s appeal from an IJ’s removal order and denying his application for voluntary departure. This court reviews de novo questions of law and claims of due process violations in immigration proceedings.

The BIA properly concluded that the peititoner is removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) because the record of conviction establishes that his 1995 conviction for violating California Health & Safety Code Section 11366.5 related to a federally defined controlled substance and he was therefore inadmissable at the time of his 1999 entry.

The petitioner’s contention that California Health & Safety Code Section 11366.5 lacks the requisite mens rea to qualify as a crime relating to a controlled substance is unavailing. To the extent the petitioner contends that he lacked the requisite mens rea for conviction, this court cannot collaterally reexamine his conviction in this instant case.

The petitioner’s statutory eligibility for voluntary departure was a question of law which the BIA is permitted by regulation to review de novo. Therefore, the petitioner’s contention that BIA’s sua sponte vacatur of the IJ’s grant of voluntary departure violated due process is unpersuasive.

The BIA erred in holding that the petitioner’s conviction under California Health & Safety Code Section 11366.5 was categorically an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). Not all the behavior prohibited by Section 11366.5 would constitute a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)-(b). First, 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) requires that the owner personally intend to engage in prohibited drug manufacturing, distribution, or usage, while Section 11366.5 requires only that the owner knowingly permit others who have such intent to engage in drug-related activity on the property. Second, although 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) and Section 11366.5 are similar, they differ in that the mens rea requirement for the former is “knowingly and intentionally” while the mens rea requirement for the latter is only “knowingly.” This court cannot read the explicit mens rea requirement of “intentionally” out of the statute. Under accepted canons of statutory interpretation, this court must interpret statutes as a whole, giving effect to each word and making every effort not to interpret a provision in a manner that renders other provisions of the same statute inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous. Because the BIA did not reach any other basis for characterizing the petitioner’s conviction as an aggravated felony, this court remands for the BIA to reconsider the petitioner’s request for voluntary departure. The petition for review is therefore denied in part, granted in part, and the case is remanded.

Hernandez v. Holder, No. 09-60261 (5th Cir. Dec. 30, 2009).

To be entitled to cancellation of removal, an alien must show that he has not been convicted of any aggravated felony. Section 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii) of Title 8, United States Code, defines “aggravated felony” as including an offense described in Section 922(g)(1) of Title 18, United States Code. Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), it is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a felony to possess, in or affecting interstate commerce, any firearm. To determine whether the petitioner’s firearm offense constitutes an “aggravated felony,” this court applies a “‘categorical approach,’ under which this court refers only to the statutory definition of the crime for which the alien was convicted and ask whether that legislatively-defined offense necessarily fits within the INA definition of an aggravated felony. This court concludes that the petitioner’s offense under TPC § 46.04(a) fits within 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii)’s definition of “aggravated felony.” Accordingly, the BIA did not err in finding that the petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal.

The petitioner’s argument that his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm under Texas Penal Code (“TPC”) § 46.04(a) was not an offense described in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) because TPC § 46.04(a) does not contain an interstate commerce element is without merit. This court holds that state felon-in possession offenses, such as TPC § 46.04(a), need not have an interstate commerce element in order for the offense to be an offense “described in” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The petition for review is therefore denied.

This Court has jurisdiction to review legal and constitutional issues raised pertaining to removal orders. The BIA’s determination that an alien is ineligible for discretionary relief in the form of cancellation of removal is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. In conducting the analysis, this court first reviews the BIA’s interpretation of the INA itself, including its definition of the INA’s words and phrases. This court then reviews de novo whether a petitioner’s conviction under a state statute constitutes an “aggravated felony” and renders him ineligible for cancellation of removal.

This court needs not determine the precise degree of deference to be afforded the BIA’s interpretation because this court concludes that it is correct as a matter of statutory interpretation. If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.

In Castillo-Rivera in Anaya-Ortiz v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 1266, 1272 (9th Cir. 2009), the Ninth Circuit held that a petitioner’s contention that his conviction was not an aggravated felony as described in § 922(g)(1) because an interstate commerce element was not present was foreclosed by United States v. Castillo-Rivera, 244 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001), which held that a state crime of conviction need not have the interstate-commerce element contained in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) to qualify as an aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii).

The statutory provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii) defines “aggravated felony” as an offense “described in” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). According to the BIA, for an offense to be “described in” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), it only has to have the same substantive elements as § 922(g)(1); jurisdictional elements, such as § 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element, are irrelevant. Section 1101(a)(43)’s penultimate sentence supports the BIA’s interpretation that jurisdictional elements, such as § 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element, are not necessary for an offense to be an “aggravated felony” as “described in” § 922(g)(1). In its “penultimate sentence,” § 1101(a)(43) states that “[t]he term [aggravated felony] applies to an offense described in this paragraph whether in violation of Federal or State law.” Section 1101(a)(43)’s penultimate sentence plainly evidences Congress’s intent that an offense constitute an aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43)(E) regardless of whether the offense falls within the jurisdiction of the states or the federal government. Because § 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element is simply an element that ensures federal jurisdiction, finding that such an element is necessary for a state offense to be one that is “described in” § 922(g)(1) would undermine Congress’s evident intent that jurisdiction be disregarded in applying this definition of “aggravated felony.”

The text of § 1101(a)(43) also shows that Congress intended more than a negligible number of state firearm offenses to be encompassed within § 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii)’s definition of “aggravated felony,” and interpreting the jurisdictional element of § 922(g) as essential for a state offense to qualify as an aggravated felony would undermine that intent. Section 1101(a)(43)’s “penultimate sentence” shows that Congress clearly intended state crimes to serve as predicate offenses for aggravated felonies, and the fact that Congress used the looser standard ‘described in’ for § 1101(a)(43)(E), rather than the more precise phrase ‘defined in’ used elsewhere in §1101(a)(43), demonstrates that Congress wanted more than a negligible number of state firearms offenses to count as aggravated felonies. Interpreting § 922(g)(1)’s interstate commerce element as essential for a state offense to qualify as an aggravated felony would violate Congress’s intent to include more than a negligible number of state offenses under § 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii), because state firearms statutes would rarely, if ever contain an interstate commerce element and convictions under such statutes would rarely, if ever specify whether the commerce element was met. This court therefore concludes that the BIA’s interpretation of § 1101(a)(43)(E)’s “described in” language is in accord with the text and purpose of § 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii), and this court adopts it in the instant case.