Tuesday, October 27, 2009

The Good, the Bad and the Ugly (Il buono, il brutto, il cattivo)


Airfix's Cowboy
Actually, this figure looks more like Lee Van Cleef in "For a Few More Dollars."




Revell's Cowboy


Monday, October 26, 2009

Krasilych v. Holder, No. 09-1026 (7th Cir. Sept. 9, 2009).

Krasilych v. Holder, No. 09-1026 (7th Cir. Sept. 9, 2009).

Where the BIA issues its own opinion and does not expressly adopt the IJ’s findings, a court of appeals review the BIA’s decision. This court reviews the agency’s legal conclusions de novo, and this court will uphold the agency’s factual determinations so long as they are supported by substantial evidence.

The petitioner’s contention that evidence gathered from Operation Durango must be suppressed if the government does not prove that the investigation adhered to the Attorney General’s Guidelines for INS Undercover Operations is a mischaracterization of this court’s holding in Pieniazek v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 792 (7th Cir. 2006). In Pieniazek, this court held that the Attorney General’s Guidelines for INS Undercover Operations were still relevant to undercover investigations despite the fact that former INS is now part of Homeland Security. However, this court expressed no opinion about whether the guidelines were legally enforceable or, if so, whether failure to follow them would require exclusion of evidence.

The Attorney General’s Guidelines for INS Undercover Operations are internal rules that have no legal force. Unlike regulations, which are adopted after notice and comment, internal rules do not bind an agency: if all the Attorney General has done is to tell his staff how he wants to exercise his discretion—language that brings his subordinates’ acts in line with his wishes but does not reduce his discretion to do otherwise—then there is no substantive rule enforceable in any forum.

Even assuming that the Attorney General’s Guidelines for INS Undercover Operations are enforceable and were not followed in Operation Durango, the BIA was still correct in approving the IJ’s decision to deny the petitioner’s request to exclude evidence because the exclusionary rule generally does not apply in removal proceedings.

The Court previously left open the possibility that the exclusionary rule may apply where there have been egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained. What the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, has to do with the petitioner’s involvement in Operation Durango-- a three-year undercover investigation coordinated by immigration authorities, the FBI, and the Social Security Administration, targeting the fraudulent procurement of immigration benefits--escapes this court, and he has not even come close to identifying an “egregious violation” of any other liberty.

The petitioner’s argument that the temporary I-551 stamp on his passport obtained during a three-year undercover investigation coordinated by immigration authorities, the FBI, and the Social Security Administration, targeting the fraudulent procurement of immigration benefits conferred upon him lawful permanent resident status is without merit.

The I-551 stamp on the petitioner’s passport was “authentic” in the sense that the same stamp would have been used if the government had approved a bona fide application for permanent residence. When used legitimately, the stamp is a symbol that immigration authorities have favorably adjudicated an application to adjust status, and in the absence of “countervailing evidence” the stamp itself can be used to verify a claim of permanent residence. Where the petitioner’s application to adjust status was never adjudicated, and where he “countervailing evidence” makes clear that the stamp—which expired of its own accord in 2001—was placed in his passport only to give Operation Durango’s fraudulent-document scheme the appearance of legitimacy, the I-551 stamp is symbolic of nothing.

Because the agency’s determination of removability is supported by substantial evidence, and the petitioner did not apply for relief from removal, the order of removal must stand.

Sunday, October 25, 2009

Againcourt, October 25, 1415

St. Crispin's and St. Crispinian's Day

Guillaume de Martel, Sire de Bacqueveille, bearer of the Oriflamme at Agincourt. He was killed in combact and the Oriflamme was lost. Matthew Bennett, Againcourt 1415: Triumph Against the Odds, Osprey Campaign No. 9 (1991).



Saturday, October 24, 2009

Classic Hong Kong Movies

影帝吳楚帆




出來撈世界, 你為吓我,我為吓你,有乜所謂啫!




Sunday, October 18, 2009

Hotaru No Hikari (螢之光) series

I got up early this morning. It was raining outside and was still dark and quiet. I could hear the rain dropping on the canvas cover outside my window that the workers left there last week. It was peaceful.

I went and made peanut butter and jam sandwiches. After wrapping myself snuggly inside a blanket, I watched the Hotaru No Hikari (螢之光) series. I have not enjoyed myself like that for a long time.

Thursday, October 15, 2009

Lin v. Holder, No. 07-0591-ag (2d Cir. Oct. 14, 2009).

Lin v. Holder, No. 07-0591-ag (2d Cir. Oct. 14, 2009).

Where the petitioner’s activity as a nurse in China includes sometimes performing examinations to pregnant women to determine a fetus’s position so that a forced abortion could be performed pursuant to China’s family planning policy, it does not amount to “assistance or participation” in persecution which would render her ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal under the INA’s “persecutor bar.”

A court of appeals reviews the BIA’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard, and uphold them if they are supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence in the record. On the other hand, the BIA’s application of law to fact is reviewed de novo.

Where the BIA did not expressly ‘adopt’ the IJ's decision, but its brief opinion closely tracks the IJ’s reasoning, this court considers in the interest of completeness both the IJ and BIA opinions, especially where doing so does not affect the outcome.

The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General may grant asylum to an alien determined to be a “refugee” within the meaning of the INA. The INA defines a “refugee” as a person who is unable or unwilling to return to a country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Excluded from that definition is “any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” This exclusion, the so-called “persecutor bar,” prevents those who have persecuted others or assisted or participated in the persecution of others from gaining refugee status and seeking asylum in the United States. The bar also applies to those seeking withholding of removal, but it does not disqualify an alien from receiving a temporary deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture.

In this Circuit, four relevant factors determine whether the persecutor bar applies to a particular alien:(1) whether the alien was “involved in” acts of persecution by ordering, inciting, or actively carrying out the acts;(2) whether there is a nexus between the persecution and the victim’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; (3) whether the alien’s actions, if not outright “involvement” under the first factor, amount to assistance or participation in persecution; and (4) whether the alien had sufficient knowledge that her actions might assist in persecution to make those actions culpable. For the persecutor bar to apply, an alien’s conduct must be persecution under either the first or third factors, and must also satisfy the second and fourth factors. In short, the petitioner is a persecutor if she knowingly did or assisted acts that would be persecution on account of the victim’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

It is settled law that forced abortion is persecution on account of political opinion.

In determining whether conduct amounts to ‘assistance’ in persecution, this court looks to the alien’s behavior as a whole. Where the alien’s conduct is active and has direct consequences for the victims it is ‘assistance in persecution.’

Where the conduct is tangential to the acts of oppression and passive in nature, however, this court declines to hold that it amounts to such assistance for the victims it is ‘assistance in persecution.’ Where the conduct is tangential to the acts of oppression and passive in nature, however, this court declines to hold that it amounts to such assistance.

Where the petitioner worked as a driver for the county health department in China and occasionally transported pregnant women to hospitals in the locked back of a van, against their will, so that county officials could perform forced abortions on them pursuant to China’s mandatory family planning policies, the petitioner is subject to the persecutor bar because through his actions, he played an active and direct, if arguably minor, role, and contributed directly to the persecution because by driving the van in which the women were locked, it ensured that the women were delivered to the place of their persecution.

The petitioner’s argument that his actions of transporting pregnant women to hospitals in the locked back of a van, against their will, so that county officials could perform forced abortions on them were involuntary, and therefore excusable, is without merit. Nothing in the record indicates that the petitioner did not have the ability to quit his job as a driver at any time in order to avoid the persecution of women.

The petitioner’s argument that his application for political asylum should have been saved by the redemptive act that he once allowed an unguarded pregnant woman he was transporting to go free after she pleaded with him is without merit. Redemptive behavior is not necessarily irrelevant to the inquiry as to whether an applicant has assisted in persecution, but the BIA was not in error when it determined that the petitioner was ineligible for asylum.

On the other hand, providing post-surgical care, including the taking of temperature and the recording of vital signs, as a nurse at a public hospital to women who had undergone forced abortion did not contribute to, or facilitate, the victims’ forced abortions in any ‘direct’ or ‘active’ way because the petitioner’s conduct neither caused the abortions, nor made it easier or more likely that they would occur; the actions were, at most, ‘tangential,’ ‘passive accommodation’ of the conduct of others and did not trigger the persecutor bar.

As to the single incident where the petitioner guarded forced abortion patients, this Court observed that guarding patients awaiting forced abortions comes closer to active assistance than does post-operative monitoring of vital signs, but where the petitioner was unarmed, and where she performed actual guard duties for only approximately ten minutes before accompanying one of the patients to the restroom and helped one of the patients to escape and lost her job as a result, the petitioner’s conduct, considered in its entirety, was tangential, and not sufficiently direct, active, or integral to the administering of forced abortions as to amount to assistance in persecution.

Where the examinations that the petitioner assisted were used to detect the position and health of the fetus--the kinds of examinations (e.g., ultrasounds) which were given to all pregnant women, whether the pregnancy is scheduled to result in a live birth, a voluntary abortion, or a forced abortion, they were more akin to routine patient care than a protocol specific to forced abortions and did not contribute to, or facilitate, the victims’ forced abortions in any ‘direct’ or ‘active’ way because they did not cause the abortions, nor did they make it more likely that they would occur. The petitioner’s actions were therefore tangential, and not sufficiently direct, active, or integral to the administering of forced abortions as to amount to assistance in persecution.

Although a redemptive act itself is not dispositive, this court must view the petitioner’s conduct as a whole, and the act of opening a side door of the hospital and allowing the woman who was scheduled for a forced abortion to escape by motorcycle with her husband while the guard was asleep suggests that she did not actively assist or participate in persecution.

In order to establish eligibility for CAT withholding, the petitioner must demonstrate that she will more likely than not be tortured if removed to her home country.

Where the petitioner affirmatively testified that she had never been arrested, detained, or physically mistreated in her home country, the IJ and the BIA did not erred in concluding that the petitioner failed to sustain her burden of demonstrating that it was more likely than not that she would be tortured in China.

Napoleonic French 2nd Hussar: Marechal-des-logis Standard Bearer

I painted the Standard Bearer from Strelets 096 Napoleonic French Hussars. This set has some inaccuracy, such as incorrectly having saddlecloths for other ranks instead of shabracks, but I could bear with that to a certain degree.


I used this as reference: Andre Jouineau, Officers and Soldiers of the French Hussars, 2nd Vol. From the 1st to the 8th Regiments 1804-1812 (Historie & Collections, Trans. Alan McKay)(2006). The above image is on page 34, Marechal-des-logis Standard Bearer of the 2nd Hussar in 1805. According to the description, this is copied from a plate in "le Plumet" by Rigo.










I did not follow the reference and painted the sabretache the regular way.